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he world food situation is currently being rapidly redefined by new driving forces.Income growth,cli-
mate change,high energy prices,globalization,and urbanization are transforming food consumption,
production,and markets.The influence of the private sector in the world food system,especially the leverage
of food retailers,is also rapidly increasing.Changes in food availability,rising commodity prices,and new pro-
ducer–consumer linkages have crucial implications for the livelihoods of poor and food-insecure people.
Analyzing and interpreting recent trends and emerging challenges in the world food situation is essential in
order to provide policymakers with the necessary information to mobilize adequate responses at the local,
national,regional,and international levels.It is also critical for helping to appropriately adjust research agendas
in agriculture,nutrition,and health.Not surprisingly,renewed global attention is being given to the role of agri-
culture and food in development policy,as can be seen from the World Bank’s World Development Report,
accelerated public action in African agriculture under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD),and the Asian Development Bank’s recent initiatives for more investment in agriculture,to name
just a few examples.
The World Food Equation,Rewritten
Demand driven by high economic
growth and population change
Many parts of the developing world have experienced high
economic growth in recent years.Developing Asia,especially
China and India,continues to show strong sustained growth.
Real GDP in the region increased by 9 percent per annum
between 2004 and 2006.Sub-Saharan Africa also experi-
enced rapid economic growth of about 6 percent in the
same period.Even countries with high incidences and preva-
lences of hunger reported strong growth rates.Of the
world’s 34 most food-insecure countries,
1  22 had average
annual growth rates ranging from 5 to 16 percent between
2004 and 2006.Global economic growth,however,is pro-
jected to slow from 5.2 percent in 2007 to 4.8 percent in
2008 (IMF 2007a).Beyond 2008,world growth is expected
to remain in the 4 percent range while developing-country
growth is expected to average 6 percent (Mussa 2007).This
growth is a central force of change on the demand side of
the world food equation.High income growth in low-
income countries readily translates into increased consump-
tion of food,as will be further discussed below.
Another major force altering the food equation is shift-
ing rural–urban populations and the resulting impact on
spending and consumer preferences.The world’s urban pop-
ulation has grown more than the rural population;within
the next three decades,61 percent of the world’s populace
is expected to live in urban areas (Cohen 2006).However,
three-quarters of the poor remain in rural areas,and rural
poverty will continue to be more prevalent than urban
poverty during the next several decades (Ravallion,Chen,
and Sangraula 2007).
Agricultural diversification toward high-value agricul-
tural production is a demand-driven process in which the
private sector plays a vital role (Gulati,Joshi,and Cummings
2007).Higher incomes,urbanization,and changing prefer-
ences are raising domestic consumer demand for high-value
products in developing countries.The composition of food
budgets is shifting from the consumption of grains and other
staple crops to vegetables,fruits,meat,dairy,and fish.The
demand for ready-to-cook and ready-to-eat foods is also
rising,particularly in urban areas.Consumers in Asia,espe-
cially in the cities,are also being exposed to nontraditional
foods.Due to diet globalization,the consumption of wheat
and wheat-based products,temperate-zone vegetables,and
dairy products in Asia has increased (Pingali 2006).
Today’s shifting patterns of consumption are expected
to be reinforced in the future.With an income growth of 5.5
percent per year in South Asia,annual per capita consump-
tion of rice in the region is projected to decline from its
2000 level by 4 percent by 2025. At the same time,con-
sumption of milk and vegetables is projected to increase by
70 percent and consumption of meat,eggs,and fish is pro-
jected to increase by 100 percent (Kumar et al.2007).In China,consumers in rural areas continue to be
more dependent on grains than consumers in urban areas
(Table 1).However,the increase in the consumption of
meat,fish and aquatic products,and fruits in rural areas is
even greater than in urban areas.
In India,cereal consumption remained unchanged
between 1990 and 2005,while consumption of oil crops
almost doubled;consumption of meat,milk,fish,fruits,and
vegetables also increased (Table 2).In other developing
countries,the shift to high-value demand has been less
obvious.In Brazil,Kenya,and Nigeria,the consumption of
some high-value products declined,which may be due to
growing inequality in some of these countries.
World food production and 
stock developments
Wheat, coarse grains (including maize and sorghum), and
rice are staple foods for the majority of the world’s
population. Cereal supply depends on the production and 
availability of stocks.World cereal production in 2006
was about 2 billion tons—2.4 percent less than in 2005 
(Figure 1). Most of the decrease is the result of reduced
plantings and adverse weather in some major producing
and exporting countries. Between 2004 and 2006, wheat
and maize production in the European Union and the
United States decreased by 12 to 16 percent. On the
positive side, coarse grain production in China increased
by 12 percent and rice output in India increased by 9
percent (based on data from FAO 2006b and 2007b). In
2007, world cereal production is expected to rise by
almost 6 percent due to sharp increases in the
production of maize, the main coarse grain.
In 2006,global cereal stocks—especially wheat—
were at their lowest levels since the early 1980s.Stocks in
China,which constitute about 40 percent of total stocks,
declined significantly from 2000 to 2004 and have not
recovered in recent years (Figure 2).End-year cereal
stocks in 2007 are expected to remain at 2006 levels.
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As opposed to cereals,the production of high-value
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1990 2006 2006/1990 1990 2006 2006/1990
Product (kg) (kg) ratio (kg) (kg) ratio
Grain 131 76 0.6 262 206 0.8
Pork, beef, and mutton 22 24 1.1  11 17 1.5
Poultry 3 8 2.4 1 4 2.8
Milk 5 18 4.0 1 3 2.9
Fish and aquatic products 8 13 1.7 2 5 2.4
Fruits 41 60 1.5 6 19 3.2
SOURCE:Data from National Bureau of Statistics of China 2007a and 2007b.
Table 2—Change in food-consumption quantity, ratios 2005/1990
Type India China Brazil Kenya Nigeria
Cereals 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.0
Oil crops 1.7 2.4 1.1 0.8 1.1
Meat 1.2 2.4 1.7 0.9 1.0
Milk 1.2 3.0 1.2 0.9 1.3
Fish 1.2 2.3 0.9 0.4 0.8
Fruits 1.3 3.5 0.8 1.0 1.1
Vegetables 1.3 2.9 1.3 1.0 1.3
























agricultural commodities such as vegetables,
fruits,meat,and milk is growing at a fast rate
in developing countries (Figure 3).
Climate-change risks will have adverse
impacts on food production,compounding
the challenge of meeting global food demand.
Consequently,food import dependency is
projected to rise in many regions of the
developing world (IPCC 2007).With the
increased risk of droughts and floods due to
rising temperatures,crop-yield losses are
imminent.In more than 40 developing coun-
tries—mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa—cereal
yields are expected to decline,with mean
losses of about 15 percent by 2080 (Fischer
et al.2005).Other estimates suggest that
although the aggregate impact on cereal pro-
duction between 1990 and 2080 might be
small—a decrease in production of less than
1 percent—large reductions of up to 22 per-
cent are likely in South Asia (Table 3).In con-
trast,developed countries and Latin America
are expected to experience absolute gains.
Impacts on the production of cereals also dif-
fer by crop type.Projections show that land
suitable for wheat production may almost
disappear in Africa.Nonetheless,global land
use due to climate change is estimated to
increase minimally by less than 1 percent.In
many parts of the developing world,espe-
cially in Africa,an expansion of arid lands of
up to 8 percent may be anticipated by 2080
(Fischer et al.2005).
World agricultural GDP is projected to
decrease by 16 percent by 2020 due to global
warming. Again,the impact on developing
countries will be much more severe than on
developed countries.Output in developing
countries is projected to decline by 20 per-
cent,while output in industrial countries is
projected to decline by 6 percent (Cline
2007).
Carbon fertilization
3 could limit the
severity of climate-change effects to only 3
percent.However,technological change is not
expected to be able to alleviate output losses
and increase yields to a rate that would keep
up with growing food demand (Cline 2007).
Agricultural prices will thus also be affected
by climate variability and change.Temperature
increases of more than 3ºC may cause prices
to increase by up to 40 percent (Easterling et
al.2007).
The riskier climate environment that is
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Figure 1—World cereal production, 2000–2007 (million tons)
Source: Data from FAO 2003, 2005, 2006b, and 2007b.
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Figure 2—World cereal stocks, 2000–2007
Source: Data from FAO 2003, 2005, 2006b, and 2007b.
Note: Data for 2007 are forecasts.
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Figure 3—Annual growth rate of high-value agriculture production, 
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Developed countries Developing countries vative insurance mechanisms,such as rainfall-indexed insur-
ance schemes that include regions and communities of small
farmers.This is an area for new institutional exploration.
Globalization and trade
A more open trade regime in agriculture would benefit
developing countries in general.Research by the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has
shown that the benefits of opening up and facilitating mar-
ket access between member countries of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and
developing countries—as well as among developing coun-
tries—would bring significant economic gains.However,
large advances in poverty reduction would not occur
except in some cases (Bouet et al.2007).Multilateral discus-
sions toward further trade liberalization and the integration
of developing countries into the global economy are cur-
rently deadlocked.The conclusion of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Doha Development Round has been
delayed due to divisions between developed and developing
countries and a lack of political commitment on the part of
key negotiating parties.In the area of agriculture,developed
countries have been unwilling to make major concessions.
The United States has been hesitant to decrease domestic
agricultural support in its new farm bill,while the European
Union has been hesitant to negotiate on its existing trade
restrictions on sensitive farm products.Deep divisions have
also emerged regarding the conditions for nonagricultural
market access proposed in Potsdam in July 2007.
In reaction to the lack of progress of the Doha Round,
many countries are increasingly engaging in regional and
bilateral trade agreements.The number of regional arrange-
ments reported to the WTO rose from 86 in 2000 to 159
in 2007 (UNCTAD 2007).Increasingly,South-South and
South-North regional initiatives have emerged—such as the
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) between
the United States and Central America and the negotiations
between the African,Caribbean,and Pacific (ACP) states
and the European Union—and they may create more
opportunities for cooperation among developing countries
and for opening up their markets.
Another development has been the improvement of
the terms of trade for commodity exporters as a result of
increases in global prices.The share of developing countries
in global exports increased from 32 percent in 2000 to 
37 percent in 2006,but there are large regional disparities.
Africa’s share in global exports,for example,increased only
from 2.3 to 2.8 percent in the same period (UNCTAD
2007).
Changes in the corporate food system
The growing power and leverage of international corpora-
tions are transforming the opportunities available to small
agricultural producers in developing countries.While new
prospects have arisen for some farmers,many
others have not been able to take advantage
of the new income-generating opportunities
since the rigorous safety and quality stan-
dards of food processors and food retailers
create high barriers to their market entry.
Transactions along the corporate food
chain have increased in the past two years.
Between 2004 and 2006,total global food
spending grew by 16 percent,from US$5.5
trillion to 6.4 trillion (Planet Retail 2007a).In
the same period,the sales of food retailers
increased by a disproportionately large
amount compared to the sales of food
processors and of companies in the food
input industry (Figure 4).The sales of the top
food processors and traders grew by13 per-


























Table 3—Expected impacts of climate 
change on global cereal production
1990–2080
Region (% change)
World –0.6 to –0.9
Developed countries 2.7 to 9.0
Developing countries –3.3 to –7.2
Southeast Asia –2.5 to –7.8
South Asia –18.2 to –22.1
Sub-Saharan Africa –3.9 to –7.5
Latin America 5.2 to 12.5
SOURCE:Adapted from Tubiello and Fischer 2007.






























producing agricultural inputs (agrochemicals,
seeds,and traits) increased by 8 percent.The
sales of the top food retailers,however,
soared by more than 40 percent.While
supermarkets account for a large share of
retail sales in most developed and many
developing countries,independent grocers
continue to represent 85 percent of retail
sales in Vietnam and 77 percent in India
(Euromonitor 2007).
The process of horizontal consolidation
in the agricultural-input industry continues
on a global scale.The three leading agro-
chemical companies—Bayer Crop Science,
Syngenta,and BASF—account for roughly half
of the total market (UNCTAD 2006).In con-
trast,the top five retailers do not capture
more than a 13-percent share of the market.
Global data,however,mask substantial differ-
ences between countries;while the top five
retailers account for 57 percent of grocery
sales in Venezuela,they represent less than 
4 percent of sales in Indonesia (Euromonitor
2007).Vertical integration of the food supply chain
increases the synergies between agricultural inputs,pro-
cessing,and retail,but overall competition within the dif-
ferent segments of the world food chain remains strong.
The changing supply-and-demand
framework of the food equation
The above-mentioned changes on the supply and demand
side of the world food equation have led to imbalances
and drastic price changes.Between 2000 and 2006,world
demand for cereals increased by 8 percent while cereal
prices increased by about 50 percent (Figure 5).
Thereafter,prices more than doubled by early 2008 (com-
pared to 2000).Supply is very inelastic,which means that it
does not respond quickly to price changes.Typically,aggre-
gate agriculture supply increases by 1 to 2 percent when
prices increase by 10 percent.That supply response
decreases further when farm prices are more volatile,but
increases as the result of improved infrastructure and
access to technology and rural finance.
The consumption of cereals has been consistently
higher than production in recent years and that has
reduced stocks. A breakdown of cereal demand by type of
use gives insights into the factors that have contributed to
the greater increase in consumption.While cereal use for
food and feed increased by 4 and 7 percent since 2000,
respectively,the use of cereals for industrial purposes—
such as biofuel production—increased by more than 
25 percent (FAO 2003 and 2007b).In the United States
alone,the use of corn for ethanol production increased by
two and a half times between 2000 and 2006 (Earth Policy
Institute 2007).
Supply and demand changes do not fully explain the
price increases.Financial investors are becoming increas-
ingly interested in rising commodity prices,and speculative
transactions are adding to increased commodity-price
volatility.In 2006,the volume of traded global agricultural
futures and options rose by almost 30 percent.
Commodity exchanges can help to make food markets
more transparent and efficient.They are becoming more
relevant in India and China,and African countries are initi-
ating commodity exchanges as well,as has occurred in
Ethiopia,for example (Gabre-Madhin 2006).
Figure 5—Global supply and demand for cereals, 2000 and 2006
Source: Data from FAO 2003, 2005, 2006b, 2007b, and 2007c.
Notes: Supply and demand of cereals refer to the production and consumption of wheat, 
coarse grains, and rice.
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international rice prices were
greater,averaging more than 100




price volatility,they require fiscal
resources and cause additional
market imperfections.Govern-
ment policies also change the
relationship between consumer and producer prices.For
instance,producer prices of wheat in Ethiopia increased
more than consumer prices from 2000 to 2006 (Figure 8).
Though international price changes do not fully trans-
late into equivalent domestic farm and consumer price
changes because of the different policies and trade positions
adopted by each country,they are in fact transmitted to
consumers and producers to a considerable extent.
The prices of commodities used in biofuel production
are becoming increasingly linked with energy prices.In
Brazil,which has been a pioneer in ethanol production since
the 1970s,the price of sugar is very closely connected to
the price of ethanol (Figure 9). A worrisome implication of
the increasing link between energy and food prices is that


























Outlook on Global Food Scarcity and 
Food-Energy Price Links
Cereal and energy price increases
W
orld cereal and energy prices are becoming increasingly linked.Since 2000,the prices of wheat
and petroleum have tripled,while the prices of corn and rice have almost doubled (Figure 6).
The impact of cereal price increases on food-insecure and poor households is already quite dramatic.
For every 1-percent increase in the price of food,food consumption expenditure in developing countries
decreases by 0.75 percent (Regmi et al.2001).Faced with higher prices,the poor switch to foods that have
lower nutritional value and lack important micronutrients.
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Table 4—Consumption spending response (%)




Bread and cereals -0.43 -0.14
Meat -0.63 -0.29
Dairy -0.70 -0.31
Fruit and vegetables -0.51 -0.23
























Figure 5—Global supply and demand for cereals, 2000 and 2006
Source: Data from FAO 2003, 2005, 2006b, 2007b, and 2007c.
Notes: Supply and demand of cereals refer to the production and consumption of wheat, 
coarse grains, and rice.
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37 40 363 777 409 1,091
Figure 8—Producer and consumer prices of wheat in Ethiopia  
                  (2000 = 100)
Jan-00
Jul-00
Sources: Data from Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia 2007 and Ethiopian Grain 
Trade Enterprise 2007.
Note: Consumer prices represent wholesale prices in Addis Ababa, and producer prices 



































Figure 7—Domestic and world prices of maize in Mexico 













Source: Data from Bank of Mexico 2007 and FAO 2007c.



























Figure 9—Brazil: Ethanol and sugar prices, January 2000–September 2007  
                  
Jan-00
Jul-00
Sources: Data from CEPEA 2007.
Notes: Fuel ethanol prices in Brazil refer to averages for the São Paulo market (mills, 
distilleries, distributors, intermediaries). Hydrous ethanol is used as a substitute for gasoline 















































into high food-price fluctuations.In the past five
years,price variations in oilseeds and in wheat
and corn have increased to about twice the lev-
els of previous decades.
5
The increasing demand for high-value com-
modities has resulted in surging prices for meat
and dairy products (Figure 10),and this is driv-
ing feed prices upward,too.Since the beginning
of 2000,butter and milk prices have tripled and
poultry prices have almost doubled.
The effects of price increase on consump-
tion are different across different countries and
consumer groups.Consumers in low-income
countries are much more responsive to price
changes than consumers in high-income coun-
tries (Table 4). Also,the demand for meat,
dairy,fruits,and vegetables is much more sensi-
tive to price,especially among the poor,than is
the demand for bread and cereals.
Scenario analyses of the
determinants of prices and
consumption
The effect of biofuels
When oil prices range between US$60 and $70
a barrel,biofuels are competitive with petro-
leum in many countries,even with existing
technologies.Efficiency benchmarks vary for
different biofuels,however,and ultimately,pro-
duction should be established and expanded
where comparative advantages exist.With oil
prices above US$90,the competitiveness is of
course even stronger.
Feedstock represents the principal share
of total biofuel production costs.For ethanol
and biodiesel,feedstock accounts for 50–70
percent and 70–80 percent of overall costs,
respectively (IEA 2004).Net production
costs—which are all costs related to produc-
tion,including investments—differ widely across
countries.For instance,Brazil produces ethanol
at about half the cost of Australia and one-third
the cost of Germany (Henniges 2005).
Significant increases in feedstock costs (by at
least 50 percent) in the past few years impinge
on comparative advantage and competitiveness.
The implication is that while the biofuel sector
will contribute to feedstock price changes,it
will also be a victim of these price changes.
Food-price projections have not yet been
able to fully take into account the impact of bio-
fuels expansion.When assessing potential devel-
opments in the biofuels sector and their
consequences,the OECD-FAO outlook makes
assumptions for a number of countries,including
the United States,the European Union,Canada,
and China.New biofuel technologies and policiesare viewed as uncertainties that
could dramatically impact future
food prices (OECD-FAO 2007).
The Food and Agricultural Policy
Research Institute (FAPRI) con-
ducts a detailed analysis of the
potential impact of policy on bio-
fuels and links between the
ethanol and gasoline markets,but
its extensive modeling is limited
to the United States.
A new,more comprehensive
global scenario analysis using
IFPRI’s International Model for
Policy Analysis of Agricultural
Commodities and Trade
(IMPACT) examines current
price effects and estimates future
ones.In view of the dynamic
world food situation and the rap-
idly changing biofuels sector,
IFPRI continuously updates and
refines its related models,so the
results presented here should be
viewed as work in progress.
Recently,the IMPACT model has
incorporated 2005/06 develop-
ments in supply and demand,and has generated two future
scenarios based on these developments:
• Scenario 1 is based on the actual biofuel investment
plans of many countries that have such plans and
assumes biofuel expansions for identified high-
potential countries that have not specified their plans.
• Scenario 2 assumes a more drastic
expansion of biofuels to double the
levels used in Scenario 1.
Under the planned biofuel expansion sce-
nario (Scenario 1),international prices increase
by 26 percent for maize and by 18 percent for
oilseeds.Under the more drastic biofuel expan-
sion scenario (Scenario 2),maize prices rise by
72 percent and oilseeds by 44 percent (Table 5).
Under both scenarios,the increase in crop
prices resulting from expanded biofuel produc-
tion is also accompanied by a net decrease in
the availability of and access to food,with calorie
consumption estimated to decrease across all
regions compared to baseline levels (Figure 11).
Food-calorie consumption decreases the most
in Sub-Saharan Africa,where calorie availability is
projected to fall by more than 8 percent if biofu-
els expand drastically.
One of the arguments in favor of biofuels
is that they could positively affect net carbon
emissions as an alterative to fossil fuels.That
added social benefit might justify some level of
subsidy and regulation,since these external benefits would
not be internalized by markets.However,potential forest
conversion for biofuel production and the impact of biofuel
production on soil fertility are environmental concerns that
require attention. As is the case with any form of agricultural
production,biofuel feedstock production can be managed in
sustainable or in damaging ways.Clear environment-related


























Figure 10—Meat and dairy prices (January 2000 = 100)  
                  
Jan-00
Jul-00
Source: Data from FAO 2007c.
Notes: Beef = USA beef export unit value; poultry = export unit value of broiler cuts; 










































Figure 11—Calorie availability changes in 2020 compared to baseline (%)
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections.
Notes: N America = North America; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; S Asia = South Asia; 
MENA = Middle East & North Africa; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; 
ECA = Europe & Central Asia; EAP = East Asia and Pacific.

































ize the positive and
negative externalities
of biofuels and ensure
that the energy out-
put from biofuel pro-
duction is greater
than the amount of







implicitly act as a tax
on basic food,which
represents a large
share of poor people’s
consumption expendi-
tures and becomes
even more costly as
prices increase,as shown above (von Braun 2007).
Great technological strides are expected in biofuel
production in the coming decades.New technologies
converting cellulosic biomass to liquid fuels would create
added value by both utilizing waste biomass and by using less
land resources.These second-generation technologies,
however,are still being developed and third-generation
technologies (such as hydrogene) are at an even earlier
phase.Even though future technology development will very
much determine the competitiveness of the sector,it will
not solve the food–fuel competition problem.The trade-offs
between food and fuel will actually be accelerated when
biofuels become more competitive relative to food and
when,consequently,more land,water,and capital are
diverted to biofuel production.To soften the trade-offs and
mitigate the growing price burden for the poor,it is
necessary to accelerate investment in food and agricultural
science and technologies,and the CGIAR has a vital role to
play in this.For many developing countries,it would be
appropriate to wait for the emergence of second-generation
technologies,and “leapfrog” onto them later.
Attempts to predict future overall food price changes
How will food prices change in coming years? This is one of
the central questions that policymakers,investors,
speculators,farmers,and millions of poor people ask.Though
the research community does its best to answer this
question,the many uncertainties created by supply,demand,
market functioning,and policies mean that no straightforward
answer can be given.However,a number of studies have
analyzed the forces driving the current increases in world
food prices and have predicted future price developments.
The Economic Intelligence Unit predicts an 11-percent
increase in the price of grains in the next two years and only a
5-percent rise in the price of oilseeds (EIU 2007).The OECD-
FAO outlook has higher price projections (it expects the
prices of coarse grains,wheat,and oilseeds to increase by 34,
20,and 13 percent,respectively,by 2016–17).The Food and
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) expects
increases in corn demand and prices to last until 2009–10,and
thereafter expects corn production growth to be on par with
consumption growth.FAPRI does not expect biofuels to have
a large impact on wheat markets,and predicts that wheat
prices will stay constant due to stable demand as population
growth offsets declining per capita consumption.Only the
price of palm oil—another biofuel feedstock—is projected to
dramatically increase by 29 percent.In cases where demand
for agricultural feedstock is large and elastic,some experts
expect petroleum prices to act as a price floor for agricultural
commodity prices.In the resulting price corridor,agricultural
commodity prices are determined by the product’s energy
equivalency and the energy price (Schmidhuber 2007).
In order to model recent price developments,changes in
supply and demand from 2000 to 2005 as well as biofuel
developments were introduced into the IFPRI IMPACT
model (see Scenario 1).The results indicate that biofuel pro-
duction is responsible for only part of the imbalances in the
world food equation.Other supply and demand shocks also
play important roles.The price changes that resulted from
actual supply and demand changes during 2000–2005 capture
a fair amount of the noted increase in real prices for grains in
those years (Figure 12).
6 For the period from 2006 to 2015,
the scenario suggests further increases in cereal prices of
about 10 to 20 percent in current U.S.dollars.Continued
depreciation of the U.S.dollar—which many expect—may
further increase prices in U.S.-dollar terms.
The results suggest that changes on the supply side
(including droughts and other shortfalls and the diversion of
food for fuel) are powerful forces affecting the price surge at
a time when demand is strong due to high income growth in
developing countries.Under a scenario of continued high
income growth (but no further supply shocks),the prelimi-
nary model results indicate that food prices would remain at
Table 5—Changes in world prices of feedstock crops and sugar by 2020 under
two scenarios compared with baseline levels (%)
SCENARIO 1  SCENARIO 2







SOURCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections (in constant prices).
aAssumptions are based on actual biofuel production plans and projections in relevant countries and regions.
bAssumptions are based on doubling actual biofuel production plans and projections in relevant countries and regions.high levels for quite some time.The usual sup-
ply response embedded in the model would
not be strong enough to turn matters around
in the near future.
Who benefits and who loses
from high prices?
An increase in cereal prices will have uneven
impacts across countries and population
groups.Net cereal exporters will experience
improved terms of trade,while net cereal
importers will face increased costs in meeting
domestic cereal demand.There are about four
times more net cereal-importing countries in
the world than net exporters.Even though
China is the largest producer of cereals,it is a
net importer of cereals due to strong domestic
consumption (Table 6).In contrast,India—also
a major cereal producer—is a net exporter.
Almost all countries in Africa are net importers
of cereals.
Price increases also affect the availability
of food aid.Global food aid represents less
than 7 percent of global official development
assistance and less than 0.4 percent of total world food
production.
7 Food aid flows,however,have been declining
and have reached their lowest level since 1973.In 2006,
food aid was 40 percent lower than in 2000 (WFP 2007).
Emergency aid continues to constitute the largest portion
of food aid.Faced with shrinking resources,food aid is
increasingly targeted to fewer countries—mainly in Sub-
Saharan Africa—and to specific beneficiary groups.
At the microeconomic level,whether a household will
benefit or lose from high food prices depends on whether
the household is a net seller or buyer of food.Since food
accounts for a large share of the poor’s total expenditures,
a staple-crop price increase would translate into lower
quantity and quality of food consumption.Household
surveys provide insights into the potential impact of higher
food prices on the poor.Surveys show that poor net
buyers in Bolivia,Ethiopia,Bangladesh,and Zambia purchase
more staple foods than net sellers sell (Table 7).The impact
of a price increase is country and crop specific.For
instance,two-thirds of rural households in Java own
between 0 and 0.25 hectares of land,and only 10 percent
of households would benefit from an increase in rice prices
(IFPP 2002).
In sum,in view of the changed farm-production and
market situation that the poor face today,there is not much
supporting evidence for the idea that higher farm prices
would generally cause poor households to gain more on
the income side than they would lose on the
consumption–expenditure side. Adjustments in the farm
and rural economy that might indirectly create new income
opportunities due to the changed incentives will take time


























Figure 12—Modeling the actual price change of cereals, 2000–2005 and 
                    scenario 2006–2015 (US$/ton)
Source: Preliminary results from the IFPRI IMPACT model, provided by Mark W. Rosegrant 















Table 6—Net cereal exports and imports 














SOURCE:Data from FAO 2007a.
Table 7—Purchases and sales of staple foods by
the poor (% of total expenditure of all poor)
Bolivia Ethiopia Bangladesh Zambia
Staple foods 2002 2000 2001 1998
Purchases by 
all poor net 
buyers 11.3 10.2 22.0 10.3
Sales by all 
poor net 
sellers 1.4 2.8 4.0 2.3

























any of those who are the poorest and hungriest today will still be poor and hungry in 2015,the target
year of the Millennium Development Goals.IFPRI research has shown that 160 million people live in
ultra poverty on less than 50 cents a day (Ahmed et al.2007).The fact that large numbers of people continue
to live in intransigent poverty and hunger in an increasingly wealthy global economy is the major ethical,eco-
nomic,and public health challenge of our time.
Poverty and the Food and Nutrition Situation
The number of undernourished in the developing
world actually increased from 823 million in 1990 to 830
million in 2004 (FAO 2006a).In the same period,the share
of undernourished declined by only 3 percentage points—
from 20 to 17 percent.The share of the ultra poor—those
who live on less than US$0.50 a day—decreased more
slowly than the share of the poor who live on US$1 a day
(Ahmed et al.2007).In Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America,the number of people living on less than US$0.50
a day has actually increased (Ahmed et al.2007).Clearly,
the poorest are being left behind.
Behind the global figures on undernourishment,there
are also substantial regional differences (Figure 13).In East
Asia,the number of food insecure has decreased by more
than 18 percent since the early 1990s and the prevalence
of undernourishment decreased on average by 2.5 percent
per annum,mostly due to economic growth in China.In
Sub-Saharan Africa,however,the number of food-insecure
people increased by more than 26 percent and the preva-
lence of undernourishment increased by 0.3 percent per
year.South Asia remains the region with the largest num-
ber of hungry,accounting for 36 percent of all undernour-
ished in the developing world.
Recent data show that in the developing world,one of
every four children under the age of five is still under-
weight and one of every three is stunted.
8 Children living
in rural areas are nearly twice as likely to be underweight
as children in urban areas (UNICEF 2006).
An aggregate view on progress—or lack thereof—is
given by IFPRI’s Global Hunger Index (GHI).It evaluates
manifestations of hunger beyond dietary energy availability.
The GHI is a combined measure of three equally weighted
components:(i) the proportion of undernourished as a
percentage of the population,(ii) the prevalence of under-
weight in children under the age of five,and
(iii) the under-five mortality rate.The Index
ranks countries on a 100-point scale,with
higher scores indicating greater hunger.
Scores above 10 are considered serious
and scores above 30 are considered
extremely alarming.
From 1990 to 2007,the GHI improved
significantly in South and Southeast Asia,
but progress was limited in the Middle East
and North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Figure 14).The causes and manifestations
of hunger differ substantially between
regions. Although Sub-Saharan Africa and
South Asia currently have virtually the same
scores,the prevalence of underweight chil-
dren is much higher in South Asia,while the
proportion of calorie-deficient people and
child mortality is much more serious in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Figure 13—Prevalence of undernourishment in developing countries, 
                   1992–2004 (% of population)
Source: Data from FAO 2006a and World Bank 2007b.
Note: The size of the bubbles represents millions of undernourished people in 2004. 
EAP—East Asia and the Pacific, LAC—Latin America and the Caribbean, SA—South Asia, 































































Table 8—Expected number of undernourished in millions,
incorporating the effects of climate change
Region 1990 2020 2050 2080 2080/1990 ratio
Developing countries 885 772 579 554 0.6
Asia, Developing 659 390 123 73 0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 138 273 359 410 3.0
Latin America 54 53 40 23 0.4
Middle East & North Africa 33 55 56 48 1.5




















Figure 15—Trends in the GHI and Gross National Income per capita 
                   (1981, 1992, 1997, 2003)
Source: Analysis by Doris Wiesmann (IFPRI) based on GHI data from Wiesmann et al. 2007 
and gross national income per capita data from World Bank 2007b.
Note:  Gross National Income per capita was calculated for three-year averages 
(1979–81, 1990–92, 1995–97, and 2001–03, considering purchasing power parity).
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Figure 14—Changes in the Global Hunger Index (GHI)
Source: Adapted from Wiesmann et al. 2007.
Note: GHI 1990 was calculated on the basis of data from 1992 to 1998. GHI 2007 was calculated 
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In recent years,countries’ progress
toward alleviating hunger has been mixed.
For instance,progress slowed in China and
India,and accelerated in Brazil and Ghana
(Figure 15).Many countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa have considerably higher GHI values
than countries with similar incomes per
capita,largely due to political instability and
war.Index scores for Ethiopia moved up and
down,increasing during times of war and
improving considerably between 1997 and
2003.
Climate change will create new food
insecurities in coming decades.Low-income
countries with limited adaptive capacities to
climate variability and change are faced with
significant threats to food security.In many
African countries,for example,agricultural
production as well as access to food will be
negatively affected,thereby increasing food
insecurity and malnutrition (Easterling et al.
2007).When taking into account the effects
of climate change,the number of undernour-
ished people in Sub-Saharan Africa may triple


















































The main findings of this update on the world food
situation are:
• Strong economic growth in developing countries is a
main driver of a changing world food demand
toward high-value agricultural products and
processed foods.
• Slow-growing supply, low stocks, and supply shocks
at a time of surging demand for feed, food, and fuel
have led to drastic price increases, and these high
prices do not appear likely to fall soon.
• Biofuel production has contributed to the changing
world food equation and currently adversely affects
the poor through price-level and price-volatility
effects.
• Many small farmers would like to take advantage of
the new income-generating opportunities presented
by high-value products (meat, milk, vegetables, fruits,
flowers).There are, however, high barriers to market
entry.Therefore, improved capacity is needed to
address safety and quality standards as well as the
large scales required by food processors and
retailers.
• Poor households that are net sellers of food benefit
from higher prices, but these are few. Households
that are net buyers lose, and they represent the
large majority of the poor.
• A number of countries—including countries in
Africa—have made good progress in reducing
hunger and child malnutrition. But many of the
poorest and hungry are still being left behind
despite policies that aim to cut poverty and hunger
in half by 2015 under the Millennium Development
Goals.
• Higher food prices will cause the poor to shift to
even less-balanced diets, with adverse impacts on
health in the short and long run.
Business as usual could mean increased misery,
especially for the world’s poorest populations. A mix of
policy actions that avoids damage and fosters positive
responses is required.While maintaining a focus on long-
term challenges is vital, there are five actions that should
be undertaken immediately:
1.Developed countries should facilitate flexible
responses to drastic price changes by eliminating
trade barriers and programs that set aside
agriculture resources, except in well-defined
conservation areas. A world confronted with more
scarcity of food needs to trade more—not less—to
spread opportunities fairly.
2.Developing countries should rapidly increase
investment in rural infrastructure and market
institutions in order to reduce agricultural-input
access constraints, since these are hindering a
stronger production response.
3.Investment in agricultural science and technology by
the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and national
research systems could play a key role in facilitating
a stronger global production response to the rise in
prices.
4.The acute risks facing the poor—reduced food
availability and limited access to income-generating
opportunities—require expanded social-protection
measures. Productive social safety nets should be
tailored to country circumstances and should focus
on early childhood nutrition.
5.Placing agricultural and food issues onto the
national and international climate-change policy
agendas is critical for ensuring an efficient and pro-
poor response to the emerging risks.14
Notes
1. The most food-insecure countries include the 20 countries with the highest prevalence of undernourishment and
the 20 countries with the highest number of undernourished people as reported in FAO 2006a.Six countries over-
lap across both categories.
2. The data on stocks are estimates that need to be interpreted with caution since not all countries make such data
available.
3. Carbon fertilization refers to the influence of higher atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide on crop yields.
4. Calculation based on data from Government of India 2007 and FAO 2007b.
5. The coefficient of variation of oilseeds in the past five years was 0.20,compared to typical coefficients in the range
of 0.08–0.12 in the past two decades.In the past decade,the coefficient of variation of corn increased from 0.09 to
0.22 (von Braun 2007).
6. The weather variables are partly synthesized because complete data are not available,so turning points on prices
will not be precise,but the trend captures significant change.
7. Calculations are for 2006 and are based on data from OECD 2007,FAO 2007a,and WFP 2007.
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